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opponents is growing, so it takes less 
courage to go to war� Achilles had the 
courage to fight face-to-face, taking  
risks and facing danger directly�  
For many, distancing oneself from 
danger—even the risk of danger—by 
using technology imposes a fundamental 
weakness on the modern warrior amid 
the challenges he faces� Kaurin presents 
a detailed analysis of courage in an 
asymmetrical context, with a prescrip-
tion for developing courageous warriors�
Another moral attribute that Kaurin 
sees as essential to the warrior ethos is 
loyalty� This loyalty is built on leader-
ship and trust and is a foundation of 
the profession of arms� Referencing 
the Illiad, she compares the loyalty of 
Achilles, the traditional warrior, with 
that of Hector, the contemporary, 
professional warrior� A strategy for 
training warriors for loyalty is laid 
out� In addition to excellent military 
ethics literature references, Kaurin uses 
film to illustrate key ethical points�
The combatant/noncombatant 
distinction must be made clear for the 
soldier considering jus in bello� Kaurin 
proposes a five-level gradation of power 
and threat, from highest to lowest:
• uniformed combat personnel
• unconventional belligerents
• those provisionally hostile
• neutral or nonhostile noncombatants
• vulnerable noncombatants
Discerning the appropriate category
of combatant/noncombatant would
determine the appropriate level of force�
Such a moral model of ascertaining
the threat level would equip the soldier
better in the ethics of jus in bello.
Kaurin’s thoughts are a contribution 
to the literature on the higher level of 
moral thinking for military leaders� She 
does not shy away from the conundrums 
the warrior faces� To maintain an 
ethical edge in asymmetrical warfare, 
military ethics must be embedded into 
the culture of the profession of arms�
THOMAS E� CREELY
The General vs. the President: MacArthur and Tru-
man at the Brink of Nuclear War, by H� W� Brands� 
New York: Doubleday, 2016� 448 pages� $30�
The relief of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur by President Harry 
S� Truman remains one of the most
controversial and debated wartime
command decisions made in the
military history of the United States�
By April 1951, Douglas MacArthur was
at the peak of his game as a military
leader� His public pressing to widen the
war in Korea, in direct contradiction
to the intent of his president, and his
public statements to that end that led
to his dismissal still fuel debate today�
H� W� Brands gives depth to the tale of 
MacArthur versus Truman by includ-
ing the complexities that existed in 
the Korean conflict and its Cold War 
context, when a U�S�-led “free world” 
was engaged in a global struggle against 
Soviet-led Communism (and especially 
Soviet interest in Central Europe)� As 
the fighting in Korea continued, official 
Washington, and the Pentagon in 
particular, worried that the war effort 
was tying down more and more U�S� 
military resources—worries that 
fueled further concerns that Moscow 
might see the United States stretched 
militarily and unable to defend 
Central Europe adequately�
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Brands highlights another lesser-known 
aspect of the Korean War: MacArthur’s 
desire to bring Chinese Nationalist 
forces into the fight� Truman and the 
Joint Chiefs, knowing how this could 
antagonize Mao’s China and possibly 
widen the war, did not view the idea 
favorably� Truman and the Joint Chiefs 
were not convinced that Chiang 
Kai-shek’s corrupt and recently defeated 
forces would prove more of an advantage 
than a burden to the fight in Korea� 
MacArthur also clearly chafed at what 
he perceived to be Truman’s hesitancy 
in fighting Communism� Truman, in 
turn, remained focused on the Com-
munist threat to Central Europe and 
U�S� commitments to its European allies, 
all the while trying to balance resisting 
Communist aggression in Korea against 
preventing the conflict from widening�
Yet the conflict in Korea did widen 
when Chinese forces entered the fray 
in November 1950—an escalation 
that caught MacArthur off guard� 
Only a month earlier, in his famous 
meeting with Truman at Wake 
Island, he categorically had dismissed 
Chinese intervention as a concern�
The central element of the MacArthur-
Truman controversy proved to be the 
persona of Douglas MacArthur himself� 
Having lived and fought in the Pacific 
since 1937 (and not having returned to 
the United States until his relief in 1951), 
MacArthur had a self-described faith in 
his understanding of the “Asian mind�” 
By 1951 MacArthur, then seventy-one, 
had lost touch with his country, which 
had changed considerably in the thirteen 
years since he had been there last� Be-
lieving he could speak for the American 
people, MacArthur allowed a draft effort 
to go forward for the 1952 Republican 
presidential nomination� Yet, not 
desiring to campaign and growing ever 
more shrill in his speeches, MacArthur 
quickly doomed his potential candidacy 
to oblivion� His seeming advocacy for 
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea 
gave civilian and military leaders further 
pause, particularly when he suggested 
“sowing of fields of suitable radio-active 
material” in theater� Interestingly, it 
was President-elect Eisenhower who 
later broke the peace talk deadlock 
by intimating his openness to using 
nuclear weapons against the Chinese�
Perhaps the most damning part of 
the MacArthur story is the general’s 
testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations Com-
mittees upon his relief of command 
and forced return from Japan� The 
testimony, which Brands recounts in 
great detail, makes for some of the best 
reading� MacArthur tries to live up to 
his reputation, yet appears to be out of 
his league before inquisitive senators� 
He ultimately loses what support he 
had from Republicans, who, while no 
fans of Truman, in the end opted not 
to cast their lots with MacArthur�
A few aspects of the book did prove 
distracting� Detailed maps of the 
Korean Peninsula showing the many 
stages of the Korean War would have 
added to the reader’s understanding of 
the conflict but are absent� Further, a 
glitch in binding resulted in the Korean 
Peninsula map that was included on the 
inside cover being upside down� The 
reviewer contacted the publisher via 
e-mail and, although acknowledged,
was not responded to� And on page
329 the author’s passage “MacArthur’s
prediction that by January 1950 the
victory would be so complete” is clearly
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a misprint, because North Korea did not 
invade South Korea until June 1950�
These items are minor and easily 
corrected in a future edition� What 
remains still is a powerful book that 
goes into great detail, benefiting 
from the storytelling ability of H� W� 
Brands� We hope that a civil-military 
conflict between a towering figure like 
MacArthur and a sitting U�S� president 
is unlikely to reoccur� Yet the story 
remains a valid one today, with its les-
sons on the reach of military power in 
a democracy, the role of the president 
in setting national policy, and the role 
of civilian oversight of military power�
DAVID L� TESKA
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory: Why 
Japanese Defeat Was Not Inevitable, by Michael 
W� Myers� Lawrence: Univ� Press of Kansas, 2015� 
208 pages� $34�95�
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory 
is “an exercise in the elucidation of 
terms”—an exercise necessary to 
determine whether the Empire of 
Japan could have avoided defeat at the 
hands of the United States and its allies� 
The focus on “terms” is important, 
as precision and clarity are vital to 
Professor Michael Myers’s effort to 
challenge the near-universal acceptance 
of the idea that Japanese defeat was 
inevitable� On the contrary, Myers 
argues that there were several points 
in the war where the arc of history was 
subject to change, given a different mix 
of luck, skill, will, or strategy� Myers’s 
book takes aim at British historian H� 
P� Willmott—a leading proponent of
the inevitability school—and Willmott’s
assertion that since “the defeat of 
Japan was assured” no single battle or 
campaign can be considered “decisive�” 
The Pacific War and Contingent 
Victory challenges this conventional 
view that inherent industrial, financial, 
and demographic shortcomings all 
but guaranteed Japanese defeat�
Myers is also careful to argue that, 
while the Japanese could have avoided 
defeat, this does not mean necessarily 
that they ultimately could have gained 
victory� Rather, Japan might have 
realized outcomes short of actual defeat, 
such as an armistice preserving some 
of the gains made early in the war, a 
return to the status quo ante bellum, or 
even a negotiated surrender that left 
Japan more intact than it would be when 
it ultimately did surrender in 1945�
Myers’s challenge to Willmott and the 
rest of the proponents of inevitable 
Japanese defeat is built on an insistence 
on precise terms: as he explains, all that 
is required is to show that there was the 
slightest chance of a Japanese victory, 
however long the odds or improbable 
the required chain of events� If, even 
under the most remote of conditions, 
a different outcome could have oc-
curred, then the inevitability argument 
is defeated� Myers then argues that if 
defeat was not a certainty, then one 
or more events—be they battles or 
campaigns or just a moment of good 
or ill fortune—had to be decisive� It is 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to 
argue with Myers’s logic� His position 
is somewhat similar to that of a lawyer 
defending the owners of a carnival who 
offer a commonly found midway game 
involving tossing softballs into milk cans 
for prizes� All the lawyer has to do is 
show that it is possible for the softball to 
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